This result holds as well for people who suffer from probability insensitivity.
f they do not treat low probability events as though they would occur with ility of zero, they will enjoy large perceived benefits when they can take a small of additional care in order to move the risk of an accident from the "high" y to "medium," or "medium" to "low." The existence of discontinuities or n points in probability functions plays havoc with intuitions about the relationship n the law and decisions about care level.
This paper explores these and other implications of optimism and insensitivity for the law. 2 The focus (Part I) is on optimism and tort law. My other main result is that sufficiently optimistic agents engage in the same level of activity under strict liability and negligence; by contrast, rational agents engage in more activity under strict liability than under negligence. The reason for this difference is that the optimistic agent under strict liability and the rational agent under negligence do not internalize accident costs when they take due care (or what they think is due care). I also discuss the difference between harm-sensitive and harm-insensitive optimism; the relationship between optimism and probability insensitivity; and the implications of optimism for bilateral accidents. Part II briefly discusses optimism and contract law, and Part III con 
Probability Errors and Tort Law
A.
Summary of Analysis
Suppose that agents are rational except that they are optimistic about low uld take too little care, whether the tort gime is strict liability or negligence. The analysis will show that for sufficiently high ve a ramatic effect on the probability of a bad event occurring.
probability accidents. When they engage in some behavior like driving, they know that their behavior creates a risk of harm. When choosing the level of care, agents know the actual probability of harm associated with each level of care when the probability is above some threshold; below that threshold the probability of harm, which is low but positive, is treated as though it were zero.
Intuition tells us that such an agent wo re levels of optimism, the agent might take too much or too little care. The effect that causes too little care is the discounting of harms: the agent underestimates expected liability for a high level of care, and so will take less care. The effect that causes too much care is that the agent can cause a (subjective, that is, error-driven) reduction of expected liability by taking a small amount of additional care. If the agent takes some level of care that causes a perceived positive probability of harm, and if a small additional amount of care would cause that probability to drop from the threshold amount to zero, then the agent will think that he is, in effect, taking a small extra precaution that will eliminate all potential liability. Which of the effects dominates depends on the relationship between the probability distribution, the level of harm, and the care function. Optimism could cause an agent to think that a bad event will not occur, or that a little extra care will ha d
In addition, for sufficiently low levels of optimism, the agent will take the optimal care, and this amount of care is invariant with respect to the amount of optimism below a threshold. The agent does not take too much care because the amount of care necessary to create zero perceived expected harm is greater than the sum of the cost of optimal care and the correctly perceived expected harm. The agent does not take too little care because at the optimal level of ca an ac ately anticipated by the w-optimism agent.
A well known result in the literature is that for unilateral accidents, strict liability t remote events as though they do not occur, nd so the main difference between strict liability and negligence-namely, that under t carry over to the case of ptimism. Strict liability with contributory negligence encourages rational victims but not re cident is risky enough to be accur lo and negligence have the same effect on care, but different effects on the level of activity. Strict liability causes the efficient level of activity; negligence causes too much activity.
However, the difference between the two rules nearly disappears when the agent is optimistic. Both rules cause too much activity; indeed, unless the risk is sufficiently remote, the two rules cause the same level of inefficient activity. The reason is that under both regimes the optimistic agent will trea a negligence the agent is not liable if he takes due care-disappears in the agent's mind.
Next, I show informally that the results can hold even under less extreme assumptions about probability misestimation. The factor that drives the results is not the possibility that people could treat certain probabilities as though they were zero, but the possibility that people have trouble thinking of probability distributions as smooth or continuous functions and divide lower and higher probability events into discrete groups.
Finally, I argue that for bilateral accidents the different effects of strict liability and negligence on rational individuals carry over to the case of optimism: both rules cause the injurer to take care but only negligence causes the victim to take care.
However, under both rules the level of care taken by injurer and victim will not be optimal. As for activity level, the different effects of strict liability with contributory negligence, and negligence, on rational individuals do no o rational injurers to engage in too much activity; negligence encourages rational injurers but not rational victims to engage in too much activity. By contrast, the two rules have the same effect on optimistic injurers and victims, encouraging both groups to engage in too much activity. Let: x = level of care (normalized, so x is also the cost of care); p(x) be the probability of an accident, as a function of the level of care (p'(x) < 0; p"(x) > 0); h = harm. For illustrative purposes, we assume that p(x) = x -2 . For simplicity harm is a constant: the agent controls only the probability of the harm occurring.
The total (that is, social) cost function, TC = x + x -2 h. The optimal level of care
x* = (2h) 1/3 . ch x* if (for example) the agent must pay h if x < x*. Figure 1 illustrates these standard results. 3 [ Figure 1 ]
Now we want to ask what happens if the agent has an irrational probability
The value of p refers to the floor below which the probability of the accident is so small that the agent treats it as if it were 0. Corresponding to p is a level of care, x', which is the threshold between levels of care associated with accurate probability assessments and levels of care associated with optimistic probability assessment. To determine the value of x', we must first make an additional assumption about whether the agent's optimism is sensitive to the level of harm or not. Consider the driver of an ordinary truck and the driver of a tanker truck 
, but one could also agin at th tanker is more sensitive. In the fi -insensitive) case,
e th e driver of the 1/2 . In the second (harm-sensitive) case,
1/2 . I will assume that optimism is harm-sensitive, which seems more realistic, but will briefly discuss the harm-insensitive case in Section I.B.3.
The agent will minimize TC i = x + p i (x)h. There are two separate cases to onsider. First, if p c is sufficiently low, and thus x' is sufficiently high, the agent will choose x = x*. The reason is that the level of care necessary to reach x' is higher than the combined care and accident costs for x*. Think of a driver who believes that he can reduce the probability of an injury to zero only by driving a Volvo but the ownership cost of a Volvo is greater than the joint cost of owning a Honda and expected liability from an accident. The driver will not buy the Volvo but will buy the Honda and take efficient care.
Second, if
i p is not too low, and thus x' is not too high,
. This is the case where the ownership cost of the Volvo, and thus the illusory sense of never being liable, is less than the combined ownership and expected accident costs of the Honda.
To find the dividing line between the two cases, one sets the cost of the "irrational" level of care that generates illusory expected zero liability (Volvo) equal to rational care (Honda):
(the expected accident cost is zero), we have: x' = (h the joint care and accident costs for
x' otherwise If we limit ourselves to the second case, where x = x', then we can ask whether x is greater than or less than x*. Setting x = x*, we get p = h / 2 ≈ 0.63 h . It turns out that it could be either. 6 If p < 0.63
Thus there are three regions: Table 1 Low Optimism Moderate Optimism High Optimism
Optimal Care Too Much Care Too Little Care
In the first region, the probability threshold (where the agent treats the probability of the event as though it were zero) is so remote, that the agent would need to incur a lot of care in order to reach it. Because the cost of care is so high, the agent would prefer choosing the level of care that minimizes the "rational" total cost function. This is the xample where the agent buys the Honda rather than the Volvo.
it worthwhile to take extra care in order to reduce expected accident cost from a positive amount to an amount he perceives as 0. See Figure 2 . The optimal level of care while driving thinks that if he does these things and buys antilock breaks he will never have an accident. He takes too much care because the extra precaution creates the illusory sense of no expected liability.
[ Figure 2 ]
In the third region, an inefficiently low level of care is sufficient to reach the entive to take additional care. See Figure 3 .
[ Figure 3 ] e In the second region, the probability threshold is not so remote, so the agent finds is, let's suppose, a good night's sleep and driving during the day; but the agent probability threshold, and the agent has no inc
The agent thinks that a good night's sleep is sufficient to reduce the probability of an accident to zero; therefore, he does not bother confining his driving to the day. is a declining function of optimism.
[ Figure 4 ]
have assu ut what ab f the agent assumes that courts will set the level of due care at x i rather than x*, then the results remain the same. The agent will take too little care or too much care, depending on
Negligence. We med strict liability, b out negligence? I p and h. Thus, the agent has the same care incentives under strict liability and negligence.
But there is another possibility. If the agent believes that the court (irrationally!) of care to x'.
will insist on setting the due care level at x*, then the agent's behavior under negligence and strict liability will differ but only in the midlevel optimism case. In the latter case, the agent will prefer to incur the cost of optimal care x*, rather than too much care, x', because x* < x'. Under negligence, the agent does not bear expected accident costs if he takes level of care x*, so he gains nothing by increasing the level
Activity Level
Now suppose that the agent can choose his level of activity. Let s = level of activity, and u(s) equal the agent's level of utility from engaging in a certain level of
The agent maximizes utility by minimizing the value of the negative expression, which means choosing optimal care x*; and then by choosing an activity level s* that maximizes utility given the per-unit join re and expected liability.
t cost of ca
Using our earlier probability function, p(x) = x -2 , it follows that utility is maximized if x* = (2h) 1/3 (minimizing the negative expression) and if s* is such that u'(s)
Now let us look at the agent's incentives if he uses optimistic probability stimat
Strict Liability e es.
The agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s,
if p is low enough, the agent will choose x i = x*. Otherwise, the agent will choose
Let us consider the two cases separately.
In the first case, where the agent chooses x i = x*, the agent internalizes the expected harm, and thus acts the same as the rational agent. Thus, he chooses s i = s*.
In the second case, where the agent chooses x i = x', the agent's utility function is,
The reason is that at x i = x', the agent treats the probability of the accident, and thus the expected accident cost, as though it were zero. Thus the agent will 
This shows that the optimistic agent will engage in too much activity as long as p is not too low. The reason is that he will simply not take account of some of the cost (low probability harms) that he inflicts on others. For arbitrarily low values of p , the agent will engage in the optimal level of activity. Thus, for a sufficiently broad distribution of p , strict liability results in too much activity.
Negligence
Under negligence, the rational agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s) -sx. It is clear from Table 1 that the level of harm will affect the chances that the agent will take the optimal level of care, or too much or too little. As harm increases, the agent is more likely to take the optimal level of care; more likely to take too much care; le f one assumed harm-insensitive optimism. The analogous table is: Table 2 Low Opt
Now, as harm increases, the agent is less likely to take the optimal level of care; more likely to take too much care; and more likely to take too little care.
The optimal level of care increases with harm. The harm-insensitive optimist will not internalize the increase in harm, while the harm-sensitive optimist will internalize it partially. This is why an increase in harm will cause the harm-sensitive optimist to act more efficiently than the harm-insensitive optimist. [ Figure 5 ] reduced, the agent will take a level of care that is optimal for a rational agent but below optimal for the optimist. If the award is increased enough, the agent will b r x i (h) and m, the court should in ward; at a lower sm, the court need to adjus the award.
Gen robability D
One objection to the analysis so far is that the assumed probability distribution (or ccident as long as he kes little care, but then when his care exceeds a threshold, he then inaccurately thinks However, my results do not depend on people believing that low probabilities are zero or ent thinks that for a range of lower care behavior the probability of an accident is the same high number; fo medium care behavior the probability f an accident is the same middle number; and for a range of low care behavior the class of probability distributions) is implausible. It does not seem likely that when a person drives a car, he accurately estimates the probability of an a ta that the probability of an accident is zero. Indeed, the evidence for optimism is mixed, and other evidence suggests that in some settings people overestimate the probability of a small harm.
even that they optimistically underestimate probabilities. My results can hold even if people are pessimistic, and overestimate the probability of a small harm. The necessary assumption is only that people are insufficiently sensitive to probabilities.
One might think, for example, that the agent's subjective probability could be a step function. The ag r a range of o probability of an accident is low, though not necessarily zero. It remains the case that the agent could take too much or too little care. Too little care is easy to understand; too much care will occur as long as the perceived drop in probability occurs soon enough after the optimal level of care, that the decline in expected accident liability is greater than the increase in the cost of care. Thus, the result does not depend on a discontinuous probability function, just on the function having at least one inflection point and a sufficiently steep slope soon after the optimal level of care. Nor does the result depend on optimism; the tail of the step function (for example) could be higher than the tail of p(x).
One other possibility is that people are optimistic, but that the optimism does not affect the slope of the objective probability function. Formally,
is a linear function, for example, then p i (x) would be just a parallel e most natural, but it is consistent with the literature, which suggests that people are more likely to be wrong
Bilateral Accidents p line that is below p(x).
This assumption might seem to be th in about low probability events than about high probability events. But even if we accepted this assumption, it has an interesting and unintuitive result, namely, that the agent would take the optimal level of care (neither too much nor too little) under both strict liability and negligence. The reason is that the marginal benefit of care remains the same if the slope does not change. Thus, the current tort system provides the correct incentives for care (although not for activity level) even if agents are optimistic.
ause e injurer to take optimal care; but full compensation under strict liability gives the ictim Suppose that the victim as well as the injurer can reduce the probability of an accident by taking care; thus p(x, y). If both agents estimate probabilities correctly, then strict liability produces less efficient levels of care than negligence does. Both rules c th v no incentive to take care. Negligence, by contrast, makes the victim bear the cost of his own carelessness when the injurer takes due care but the accident occurs anyway. Now suppose that both parties are optimistic. As we saw before, the injurer will take the same level of care under both rules. Putting aside for the moment the level of care, the first thing to see is that the effect of the two rules on the victim remains the same: the victim will have no incentive to take care under strict liability, and will have such an incentive under negligence. Now returning to the question of level of care, the injurer could take too much or too little care; the victim under the negligence regime will also take too much or too little care, both because the victim himself is optimistic, and because the victim's choice will be affected by the inefficient level of care chosen by the jurer. 8 C.
Insurance and Redistribution
The argument so far illustrates some of the complex implications of probability timat in
As to the question of activity level, for rational agents strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence causes victims to engage in too much activity;
negligence causes injurers to engage in too much activity. 9 For sufficiently (midlevel or high level) optimistic agents, under both rules victims and injurers will engage in too much activity. For strict liability with contributory negligence, the injurer will act as though he were governed by a negligence rule and not internalize accident costs above x i .
For negligence, the victim will act as though he will not incur accident costs above y i .
Thus, the two rules have the same behavioral effects, and the choice between the rules no longer matters. es ion error for care and activity level. Here, I will briefly point out its implications for insurance and redistribution, focusing on optimism.
If people underestimate low probability events, they will buy too little insurance.
But if they are optimistic, they might take too much, rather than too little, care. For 8 There are interesting variations that one could consider: suppose that victims are rational and mistakenly ink that the injurer will choose x* rather than x i . Or that the victims are rational but understand that injurers will choose x i . One could also assume that the injurer is rational but the victim is optimistic, and so on. th 9 Shavell, supra note __. e e, rather than putting in too few smoke detectors because he is heavily insured, a homeowner might put in too many smoke detectors in order to reduce his perceived probability of a serious fire to zero. An uninsured optimist, then, might face less risk of fire than an insured person who is rational.
Jolls argues in a different context that optimism can justify redistributing wealth through the tort system. 10 Because people underestimate low probability events, redistributive tort awards will distort neither their care nor their labor/leisure choice, and so will h xampl ave a less negative effect than high taxes, which people can anticipate more asily and which distort their labor/leisure choice. In terms of the model, Jolls argues that nt shows that redistributive tort awards can distort the behavior of ptimists. bability distribution is p i (x). The analysis is the same as in the tort case. A complete contract would specify x i , which could be greater or less than x*; if the contract is incomplete and expectation damages is the remedy, the same result will be achieved. In addition, people will enter too many contracts because they will discount losses caused by low probability events (as before).
II. Some Comments on Probability Errors and Contract
Suppose instead that Seller is rational at the time that he enters the contract but expects tha he will want to n is possible at time 2). But verifiability problems will often p a agree to liquidated damages. If the Seller expects to choose x i < x*, then he will want low liquidated damages; if he expects to choose x i > x*, then he will want high liquidated damages. The reason is that liquidated damages can be used to shift the p i (x)h curve up or down, in such a way as to cause the optimistic Seller at time 2 to choose x*. This shows, 11 Cooter and Ulen, supra note __.
an argument for the penalty doctrine. Parties might agree to high liquidated damages in order to blunt the effects of optimism.
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III. Welfare
In welfare economics, it is conventional to assume that the goal of the state is to maximize social welfare, which is some aggregation of the individual utility functions of all citizens.
Suppose that an agent prefers driving a car to taking a bus, but only because he nderestimates the probability of a car crash. Should the state tax car driving in order to ake th e activity that can injure only himself, and no one lse. He is an optimist, and ignores the small chance that the activity will injure him.
and risk estimation-are not easily reconcilable with welfare economics, and thus cannot u m e agent act the same way as he would if he knew the correct probability of the car crash? The legal literature answer this question positively, and a positive answer was implicitly assumed in the analysis in Parts I and II of this paper.
But the problem is more complex. To see why, consider the simplest case.
Suppose that an agent engages in som e Suppose the government now mandates a precaution that reduces the low probability of an injury to zero. The agent will perceive this mandate as a cost, with no offsetting benefits. Therefore, his utility will decline, and so will the social welfare function. A welfare-maximizing government would therefore not impose what otherwise would seem to be a sensible mandate.
The problem also occurs in the more general tort case, whenever victims are optimistic. High tort awards designed to counter the wrongdoer's carelessness will not be experienced as an ex ante gain by the victim, and will not affect the victim's behavior.
The insights of cognitive psychology-especially those relating to biases in perception be straightforwardly imported into normative law and economics. 
Conclusion
The most important methodological point I want to make is that when one tries to operationalize the insights of cognitive psychology, and make them useable for law and economics, one must make certain specific assumptions about the shape of probability functions, and terms like "optimism" are too vague to be of help. A person who underestimates low probability events might be called an optimist, but he also might be called a pessimist (in certain ranges) about the likelihood that more care will avoid accidents. The pessimist about care might act the same as the optimist about liability. The paper has explored vario im The paper also has some testable empirical implications. One might use psychological exams to test for optimism, and then see whether optimistic people take the same level of care under strict liability and under negligence, or whether optimistic people are more likely to take too much care under both rules than nonoptimistic people then they should take the optimal level of care when harm is low, higher levels of care when harm is moderate, and lower levels of care when harm is high. Indirect tests like these would be difficult, and open to multiple interpretations, but they might be a useful way for avoiding the problem of measuring optimism. 
Figure 5 
